This commentary highlights the observation that social motivation is usually an imprecisely specified construct. We suggest four social motivation conceptualizations across levels of analysis and explore where the target article situates among these. We then offer theoretical and practical guidance for operationalization and measurement of social motivation to support more comprehensive future research on this complex construct in the autism literature.

Communicable diseases, especially those that are highly contagious, are on the rise and each of us, no matter who we are or where we live, is equally at risk of transmitting contagious diseases to others as we are of contracting such diseases from others. Because contagious diseases are as readily passed state-to-state as person-to-person, we all have a stake in every country's ability to enact effective infectious disease control policies, while policies grounded in shared values are more likely to gain (...) widespread acceptance and thereby prove most effective. This paper suggests that principlism proved invaluable as an ethical framework for resolving hard medical cases and setting health care policy because it nicely “fits” dilemmas that arise in the context of the special relationship between doctors and patients or within family units. It then argues that communitarianism provides the better foundation for crafting infectious diseases control policies because contagious diseases, which often pass between perfect strangers, raise questions about the moral obligations we owe to (or are entitled to demand of) people with whom we share no “special” relationship. Accordingly, a socially embedded framework such as communitarianism may be a better fit for the more socially embedded ethical dilemmas of communicable diseases. (shrink)

Communicable diseases, especially those that are readily contagious, are on the rise as evidenced by the emergence of viruses like severe acute respiratory syndrome, the global resurgence of resistant forms of ancient mycobacteria such as extensively drug resistant tuberculosis, and the 2009 swine flu outbreak in Mexico. Moreover, each of us, no matter who we are or where we live, is just as likely to transmit contagious diseases to others as we are to contract such diseases from others. As cogently (...) described in the title of a recent book by Margaret Battin et al., we are all potential “victims and vectors.”Just as contagious diseases are readily passed person to person, so too can they readily be passed across local and national boundaries. We therefore all have a stake in the development of effective infectious disease control policies on a national scale, with “effective” being the operative term: regulations and statutes that are neither enforceable nor likely to be complied with may do more harm than good. (shrink)

The cognitive revolution in the 1950s and 1960s led researchers to view the human mind--like a computer--as an information-processing system that encodes, represents, and stores information and is constrained by limits on hardware and software. The emergence of new behavioral, computational, and neuroscience methodologies, has deeply expanded psychologists' understanding of the workings of the infant, child, and adult mind. One result is that research has focused on mechanisms of change, over developmental time, in the information-processing mind.In this book, Lisa Oakes, (...) Cara Cashon, Marianella Casasola, and David Rakison bring together the recent findings and theories about the origins and early development of the information-processing mind, and provide insight into the future directions in the study of infant perception and cognition. The contributors represent a wide-range of research areas in the study of infant perception and cognition, who emphasize the use of diverse methodological techniques to address key questions about development. Their chapters demonstrate how the combination of historical perspectives on the information-processing approach to cognition and recent advances in behavioral, computational, and neuroscience approaches to cognition has contributed to our understanding of how abilities ranging from visual attention to face processing to object categorization have developed during infancy. Across this broad range of topics, it is clear that much of our modern understanding of infant perceptual and cognitive development emerges from the foundation of classic information-processing models of development, such as that of Leslie B. Cohen. The recent advances illustrated in this book show how researchers have built on this foundation to uncover the mechanisms that drive developmental change. (shrink)

fusion theory challenges efforts to see theory as inhibiting by presenting an approach that is innovative, eclectic, and subtle in order to draw out competing and constellating ideas and opinions. This collected volume of essays examines fusion theory and demonstrates how the theory can be applied to the reading of various works of Indian English novelists.

This article describes the spiritual formation training program for counseling students at Richmont Graduate University, an evangelical institution providing Master’s-level instruction for counselors and ministers. This model of spiritual formation has a dual foundation which includes the centrality of love to the Christian life and the importance of attachment to the development of persons. The training is intentionally designed to invite students to pursue a more secure attachment to God, healthier relationships with others, and a more grace-based self-awareness. Integrative and (...) clinical instruction, and experiences that foster establishment of secure attachment are described. Co-curricular efforts in research and student advisement focus on grace and wellness, as well as opportunities for service, and these serve to further contribute to a supportive environment for spiritual formation. (shrink)

The authors show. by means of a finitary version $\square_{\lambda D}^{fin}$ of the combinatorial principle $\square_\lambda^{h*}$ of [7]. the consistency of the failure, relative to the consistency of supercompact cardinals, of the following: for all regular filters D on a cardinal A. if Mi and Ni are elementarily equivalent models of a language of size $\leq \lambda$ , then the second player has a winning strategy in the Ehrenfeucht- $Fra\uml{i}ss\acute{e}$ game of length $\lambda^{+}$ on $\pi_{i} M_{i}/D$ and $\pi_{i} N_{i}/D$ . (...) If in addition $2^{\lambda} = \labda^{+}$ and i < $\lambda$ implies | $M_{i}$ | +| $N_{i}$ | $\leq$ \lambda^{+} this means that the ultrapowers are isomorphic. This settles negatively conjecture 18 in [2]. (shrink)

Communicative Understandings of Women's Leadership Development: From Ceilings of Glass to Labyrinth Paths, edited by Elesha L. Ruminski and Annette M. Holba, weaves the disciplines of communication studies, leadership studies, and women's studies to offer theoretical and practical reflection about women's leadership development in academic, organizational, and political contexts. This work claims a space for women's leadership studies and acknowledges the paradigmatic shift from discussing women's leadership using the glass ceiling to what Eagly and Carli identify as the labyrinth of (...) leadership. (shrink)

En este artículo proponemos reflexionar en torno a una cuestión que ocupa un lugar central en la práctica educativa, política y evangelizadora, a saber, el problema de la paz. Asunto que toma especial relevancia, sobre todo si se tiene en cuenta el momento coyuntural por el que atraviesa Colombia y en general la sociedad contemporánea. La tesis que sostiene el artículo es que la ausencia de la guerra no supone necesariamente la consecución de la paz, pues ella conlleva a una (...) suerte de condiciones de aceptación de un ethos que naturaliza prácticas bélicas que dividen, atomizan la sociedad creando un sentido de desesperanza y de despolitización. Proponemos que, para afrontar esta situación, es decir, para desnaturalizar dicho ethos hace falta una dimensión espiritual que permita el establecimiento de fuertes lazos sociales y del reconocimiento de las diferencias, la particularidad e individualidad. Para desarrollar esta labor proponemos, entonces, un diálogo a partir de los presupuestos de la espiritualidad y el pensamiento franciscano, especialmente desde los conceptos de fraternidad y de minoridad con la cuestión en mención. Con esto entendemos que el marco de comprensión que nos brindan los presupuestos franciscanos cuenta con un potencial relevante para contribuir al debate sobre de la paz en tiempos actuales del posconflicto colombiano. (shrink)

Partiendo de la tensión entre pertenencia cultural y participación intercultural, se intenta pensar la exigencia de que la Nación y la Democracia puedan ser relacionadas desde lo intercultural, recurriendo para ello a la tesis de Ernest Renan sobre la Nación como principio espiritual y plebiscito cotidiano, así como a la defensa radical de la Democracia en el pragmatismo y neopragmatismo, así como, en otra línea, a la separación «terapéutica» entre Democracia y Política propuesta por Jean-Luc Nancy de cara a (...) pensar la «verdad» de la democracia, que se condensa en la primacía del vivir-juntos más allá de la defensa a ultranza de las posibilidades de representar, objetivar y decidir «acabadamente» ese con-vivir.We try to think relations between Nation and Democracy from an intercultural point of view, basing on the tension between cultural belonging and intercultural participation. To this aim, we take Ernest Renan’s thesis on the Nation as spiritual principle and daily plebiscite, as well as the radical defense of Democracy in pragmatism and neo-pragmatism. And, in another line, we take also the «therapeutic» separation between Democracy and Politics proposed by Jean-Luc Nancy in order to think the «truth» of Democracy. This last idea becomes condensed in the primacy of living-together beyond extreme defense of possibilities of representing, objetifying and «finished» deciding this to live-with. (shrink)

M. Blondel, cuya "filosofia de la acción" se halla en la linea del "espiritualismo frances" para el que la filosofía no es una actividad puramente de la razón sino del conjunto de la vida, abordó, después de L'Action (1893), el tema del conocimiento en L'illusion idéaliste (1898). Su propósito era responder a las "ilusiones" del conocimiento - "realista" e idealista - , particularmente a esta última. Para ello justifica la utilización de un "método de inmanencia" - no del sistema de (...) inmanencia - y reconduce el conocimiento hacia una forma de acción. En el artículo se presenta este proceso, y se discute las implicaciones que tiene de cara a la verdad y a la naturaleza de la transcendencia epistemológica y religiosa. /// M. Blondel, dont la "philosophie de l'action" se dévellope dans le sillage du "spiritualisme français" pour lequel la philosophic n'est pas une activité de la pure raison, mais de l'emsemble de la vie, a abordé, après L'Action (1893), le théme de la connaissance dans L'illusion idéaliste (1898). Son intention était de répondre aux illusions de la connaissance - "realiste" et idéaliste - en particulier à cette dernière. Pour ce faire, il montre qu'il faut utiliser une "méthode d'immanence" - non pas du système de l'immanence - et reconduire la connaissance vers une forme d'action. Le present article décrit ce processus et discute les implications qu'il suscite quant à la vérité et à la nature de la transcendance épistemologique et religieuse. /// After L'Action (1893), M. Blondel, whose "philosophy of action" is in line with "french spiritualism", which takes philosophy as an activity envolving not simply reason but the whole life, has dealt with the issue of knowledge in L'Illusion idealiste (1898). He aimed to explain the ''illusions" of knowledge - both the ''realist" and the "idealist" ones - , but particularly the latter. It is for this reason that he justifies the use of a "method of immanence" - not of a system of immanence, and deals with knowledge as a type of action. The paper explains this process and discusses its implications as to both truth and the nature of epistemologic and religious transcendence. (shrink)

In metaethics, evolutionary debunking arguments combine empirical and epistemological premises to purportedly show that our moral judgments are unjustified. One objection to these arguments has been to distinguish between those judgments that evolutionary influence might undermine versus those that it does not. This response is powerful but not well understood. In this paper I flesh out the response by drawing upon a familiar distinction in the natural sciences, where it is common to distinguish folk judgments from theoretical judgments. I argue (...) that this in turn illuminates the proper scope of the evolutionary debunking argument, but not in an obvious way: it is a very specific type of undermining argument that targets those theories where theoretical judgments are inferred merely from folk judgments. One upshot of this conclusion is that it reveals a verboten methodology in metaethics. The evolutionary debunking argument is therefore much less powerful than its proponents have supposed, but it nevertheless rules out what is perhaps a common way of attempting to justify moral judgments. (shrink)

In much of the current academic and public discussion, conspiracy theories are portrayed as a negative phenomenon, linked to misinformation, mistrust in experts and institutions, and political propaganda. Rather surprisingly, however, philosophers working on this topic have been reluctant to incorporate a negatively evaluative aspect when either analyzing or engineering the concept conspiracy theory. In this paper, we present empirical data on the nature of the concept conspiracy theory from five studies designed to test the existence, prevalence and exact form (...) of an evaluative dimension to the ordinary concept conspiracy theory. These results reveal that, while there is a descriptive concept of conspiracy theory, the predominant use of conspiracy theory is deeply evaluative, encoding information about epistemic deficiency and often also derogatory and disparaging information. On the basis of these results, we present a new strategy for engineering conspiracy theory to promote theoretical investigations and institutional discussions of this phenomenon. We argue for engineering conspiracy theory to encode an epistemic evaluation, and to introduce a descriptive expression—such as ‘conspiratorial explanation’—to refer to the purely descriptive concept conspiracy theory. (shrink)

O presente artigo discute o direito a ter direitos, compreendido como a formulação de uma personalidade jurídica a partir da qual são atribuídos direitos legais aos indivíduos. A partir de uma pesquisa bibliográfica de caráter qualitativo, a problemática desenvolvida nesta pesquisa consiste em ampliar esse conceito para além de seu diagnóstico político-jurídico, compreendendo a ideia de descartabilidade decorrente de sua destituição pelos regimes totalitários como uma consequência da mudança de percepção moral sobre a humanidade. A hipótese a ser analisada é (...) a de que de que o direito a ter direitos pode vir a ser interpretado como uma teoria da dignidade humana à medida em que, para ser efetivado, depende de uma moralidade que permita o reconhecimento mútuo entre os indivíduos e que perceba o corpo como um limite que deve ser respeitado. (shrink)

Early in his Essays on Intellectual Powers, Reid draws a distinction between mental power, mental operation, and mental capacity (EIP 21). To the untrained eye, these terms could probably be used interchangeably, and Reid believes this is correct, up to a point. He argues that, if we are interested in understanding exactly how the human mind works, we must use these terms with more precise meanings. This is part of his more general strategy of trying to always use the words (...) with their common meanings, as much as possible, but also pointing out that certain philosophical distinctions are needed to carry out the project of laying out the foundations of the science of the mind. This paper explains what the distinction between power, operation, and capacity is, according to Reid, with the goal of understanding why it is important to draw such a distinction, not only for the Reidian project, but for action theory, more generally. (shrink)

O nexo decisivo da teoria da arte em Luigi Pareyson consiste em uma metafísica da criação artística. No texto que propomos aqui, o cerne da questão é o ser que acontece - Acontecer - não significa para Pareyson o _Ereignis_ heideggeriano, mas o acontecer na arte e na pessoa. É na arte, que pode ser entendida a teoria da _formatividade_ onde todo operar humano é uma feitura de formas reunidas na noção de obra-forma. Os aspectos da operatividade humana têm um (...) caráter essencial de _formatividade_, concretizando-se em um acontecer que resulta em obras. Mas, só fazendo-se forma é que a obra acontece em sua irrepetível realidade; separada de seu autor e adquirindo vida própria, na sua indivisível unidade, abrindo-se à exigência e ao reconhecimento de seu valor singular e irrepetível. _Formatividade_ é produção artística, feitura-invenção-acontecimento até a sua recepção pública. A experiência estética e a experiência concreta caminham de mãos dadas. O artista, ao criar, inventa leis e ritmos totalmente novos, por meio de uma livre escolha sugerida, tanto pela tradição cultural quanto pelo mundo físico, um acontecer cuja decodificação ocorre pela perseverança e dedicação do artista. Infere-se, pois, que o cerne da _formatividade_ é a recorrência direta à experiência. É nesse sentido que ao longo do texto se evidenciará a visão _receptiva, inventiva e produtiva, _simultaneamente; o acontecer segue a inteireza própria da formação da obra de arte e da ideia de Obra-forma; a feitura-criação da arte e sua inseparabilidade. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:One Body: An Essay in Christian Sexual Ethics by Alexander R. PrussBenedict M. Guevin O.S.B.One Body: An Essay in Christian Sexual Ethics. By Alexander R. Pruss. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2013. Pp. ix + 465. $45.00 (paper). ISBN: 978-0-268-03897-7.As a professor of moral theology in general and of sexual ethics in particular, I found Alexander Pruss’s largely philosophical account of sexual ethics to be (...) refreshing. As much as I try to dissuade my students from using religious legalism to justify the rightness or wrongness of certain sexual practices, I find it almost impossible to break them of the bad habit of using such phrases as “Because the Church teaches...” or “Because the Bible says...”. Even when I counter by saying, “The Church teaches that something is good because it is good and not because the Church says it is good, and such goodness is grounded in the natural law and a sound anthropology,” such legalism still persists. And so, to read Pruss’s extensive analysis of sexual ethics using both personalist and Thomistic principles as well as what we have received from divine revelation is a much-needed tonic not only for students of theology and philosophy but for all those interested in discovering the role of human reason and biology in crafting a sexual ethic.After an introduction, the proper beginning of Pruss’s analysis is found in chapter 2. Here, the author discusses love and its forms with a particular focus on the meaning of agapē in the New Testament. Pruss argues that, philosophically speaking, we should love everyone. But love should not be understood as monolithic. There are various kinds of love: agapē, philia, and erōs. The New Testament understanding of agapē contains the other two, for it is love itself. This kind of love is a love that loves the other as the other is, for the other’s sake, and in a way that is appropriate to that person in the light of objective facts. Moreover, this kind of love is not simply a feeling or an emotion but is concentrated in an action that is an expression of one’s will.In chapter 3, Pruss takes up the issue of desire. He evaluates desire in two ways: (1) desire and libido, and (2) sexual desire, need, and pleasure. He [End Page 485] concludes that sexual desire is not a need in the same way that we desire food, drink, communication, love, and to be loved. Without these latter, human life would be seriously lacking or, in the case of food and drink, quickly cut short. Second, he observes that circumstances may not be appropriate for fulfilling one’s sexual desire. Finally, while human life would be seriously compromised by the lack of food, drink, communication, love, and the need to be loved, abstaining from the fulfillment of sexual desire even over a long period of time would not be detrimental to human well-being in the same way.Pruss does not imply by the preceding that sexuality does not matter. Chapter 4, in fact, deals with the meaningfulness of sexuality. There are two sets of rules regarding sexuality and its expression. Some rules are moral in nature, like the prohibition against rape. Other rules are customs, for example, the exchanging of rings after the exchange of marital vows. With respect to the moral rules regarding sexuality, Pruss highlights casual sex, sexual assault, gay rights, and romantic love. Apart from sexual assault and rape—both of which lack consent—casual sex, homosexual sex, and romantic love have the following in common, namely, that sex is indeed innately important to human beings and that sex aspires to be romantic in nature. While, as in the case of casual sex, romantic love does not necessarily give rise to true love, romantic love is often the prelude to a deep and unique form of love. Why this is so has to do with the meaning of sexual union.Sexual union is the topic of chapter 5, presented under the title “One Flesh, One Body.” Scripture, Pruss affirms, describes the person as... (shrink)

Este trabalho pretende descrever a denominada questão normativa, apresentada pela Professora Christine M. Korsgaard em seu The Sources of Normativity, e, depois, apresentar a filosofia moral tomista, procurando, nela, uma possível resposta ao problema. O trabalho, primeiro, introduz o pensamento moral de Korsgaard, apresentando o problema, e o seu argumento para encontrar a fonte da normatividade. Em um segundo momento, apresenta os fundamentos da teoria moral de Tomás de Aquino, aprofundando-se, especialmente, no estudo do ato voluntário – dado seu caráter (...) central no estudo da moral – e da ordenação dos atos ao fim. Por fim, procura-se compreender a natureza da lei moral, com destaque para as noções de obrigação e de sanção. (shrink)

Jan Narveson has articulated a deeply held, widely shared intuition regarding what moral law has to say about bringing additional people into existence: while we are “in favour of making people happy,” we are “neutral about making happy people.” Various formulations of the Narvesonian intuition (closely related to the _person-affecting intuition_ or _restriction_) have been widely criticized. This present paper outlines an off-the-beaten-path alternate construction of the intuition—the _existence condition_—and argues that that particular construction has the resources to avoid some (...) of those criticisms. But still other considerably more widely recognized alternate constructions have been offered as well. Thus John Broome outlines what he calls the _neutrality intuition_. While Broome finds the underlying intuition “strongly attractive,” he nonetheless argues that the neutrality intuition itself leads us quickly into inconsistency. Wlodek Rabinowicz disagrees. On his view, Broome’s inconsistency argument shows, not that the neutrality intuition is false, but rather that it doesn’t follow, from the fact that the outcome, or possible future or _world_, that includes the additional person is neither better nor worse than the (otherwise similar) world that excludes that person, that the one world is exactly as good as the other. The better view, according to Rabinowicz, is that, on occasion, and specifically when the coming into existence of additional people is at stake, the one world is _incommensurate_ with the other. What is called the _principle of trichotomy_ is, in other words, false. Difficulties arise, however, when we try to reject that seemingly compelling conceptual principle. This present paper concludes with the argument that the availability of the existence condition—which, together with certain other uncontroversial moral principles and a handful of conceptual principles, forms the _existential approach_—shows that we can maintain the most intuitive parts of neutrality intuition while avoiding both Broome’s inconsistency worry and Rabinowicz’s commitment to incommensurability. Incommensurability may be correct on other grounds—but not, this present paper argues, on the grounds provided by Broome’s inconsistency argument. (shrink)

This paper examines the role of reason in Shepherd's account of acquiring knowledge of the external world via first principles. Reason is important, but does not have a foundational role. Certain principles enable us to draw the required inferences for acquiring knowledge of the external world. These principles are basic, foundational and, more importantly, self‐evident and thus justified in other ways than by demonstration. Justificatory demonstrations of these principles are neither required, nor possible. By drawing on textual and contextual evidence, (...) I will show that Shepherd should have said that we know the first principles of any science, in general, and that “everything which begins to exist must have a cause”, in particular, via intuition, not via reason. Reasoning about such principles can help their self‐evidence shine through in certain cases; their justification, and our being justified in believing them, does not come from this reasoning, however. (shrink)

Is it possible to establish a line of research that brings Gabriel Marcel and Jean-Paul Sartre closer together? With this article, we will positively support this idea, by distancing ourselves from the overly rigid interpretations that exclusively focus on antinomic elements sliding into a reductionist and nowadays “canonical” presentation of the relationship between these philosophers. Beyond the undeniable and, fortunately, unmediated differences between the two philosophers, this article aims to investigate their positions regarding the concept of “relationship”. In doing so, (...) we will highlight how Gabriel Marcel’s “coesse” and Jean-Paul Sartre’s “being-for-others” have numerous points of contact that place both philosophers, beyond their personal positions in the religious sphere, within the common ground of “existentialism”. (shrink)

La presencia de Platón y del pensamiento platónico se ha mantenido de manera incesante a lo largo de la historia de la cultura. En esta historia, el siglo XX refleja el rechazo y la aceptación, la recepción, en suma, de un modo inusitado tal vez porque, durante este siglo, la humanidad se vio cara a cara con los infiernos que supo crear: un mundo en ruinas hacía imposible intuir la perfecta quietud de las Formas. La recepción de Platón (...) en el siglo XX bucea en la recepción de Platón en aquel mundo contradictorio: ¿cómo se integra su pensamiento fundacionalmente metafísico con la deconstrucción de la metafísica? ¿Cuáles son los alcances de la crítica que la teoría política hace, desde la época de los totalitarismos, al autor de la República? ¿Qué valor cognoscitivo y pedagógico puede tener en mito platónico para filósofos cristianos que se ocupan del pensamiento platónico? ¿Cómo recibe la poesía hispanoamericana su voz de demiurgo? Estas preguntas, de las que se ofrecen diversas respuestas en este libro, son tratadas con rigor académico y confrontadas doblemente con las fuentes: en primer término, con Platón y luego con quienes son estudiados en el presente volumen, aunque desde ángulos muy diversos: M. Heidegger, H. G. Gadamer, K. Popper, E. Cassirer, L. Marechal. La seguridad del tratamiento metodológico y lingüístico que se refleja en esta obra hace que sea altamente recomendable para alumnos de grado y de posgrado en Filosofía, Teoría Política, Literatura y Humanidades en general. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Martha Nussbaum's Aristotelian analysis of compassion and pity is faulty, largely because she fails to distinguish between an emotion's basic constitutive conditions and the associated constitutive or "intrinsic" norms, "extrinsic" normative conditions, for instance, instrumental and moral considerations, and the causal conditions under which emotion is most likely to be experienced. I also argue that her defense of compassion and pity as morally valuable emotions is inadequate because she treats a wide variety of objections (...) as all stemming from a common commitment to a Stoic conception of the good. I argue that these objections can be construed as neutral between conceptions of the good. I conclude by arguing that construed in this way there are nonetheless plausible replies to these objections. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Opining the articuli fidei:Thomas Aquinas on the Heretic’s Assent to the Articles of FaithM. V. DoughertyTHOMAS AQUINAS’S ACCOUNT of the infused virtue (habitus) of faith presupposes that some intrinsically intelligible truths are beyond the range of the natural cognitive abilities of human beings. The possession of the virtue of faith allows the believer to transcend certain natural epistemic limitations so that he can assent to truths that are necessary (...) for salvation. Consonant with the Catholic theological tradition, Aquinas refers to such truths as the articles of faith (articuli fidei), and stock examples include propositions concerning the Trinity and the Incarnation.1In light of the many and well-known texts from the Corpus Thomisticum that highlight the disproportion or incommensurability between the articles of faith and the natural cognitive abilities of human beings, it would not be unreasonable for one to assume that faith is required to assent to such articles of faith [End Page 1] in this life. Such an interpretive assumption could be expressed as:A1: A human being can assent to the articles of faith in this life if and only if the human being is fortified with the infused virtue of faith.One might be led to ascribe A1 to Aquinas when one considers that he criticizes the Pelagians precisely for maintaining that the assent to matters of faith is caused by nothing other than free will.2 Still further, one might think that strong evidence for A1 is Aquinas’s claim that “free will does not suffice for believing, since those things that are of faith are above reason.”3I argue, however, that A1’s identification of the virtue of faith as a necessary condition for the assent to the articles of faith does not adequately reflect Aquinas’s position, despite the many texts that may suggest such a view.4 That Aquinas does not endorse A1 can be made evident by examining his largely overlooked account of the epistemic state of the heretic (haereticus). To be sure, most commentators who explore the Thomistic treatment of heresy focus on the psychology of error underlying the heretic’s denial of one or more of the articles of faith.5 In the present paper I take an alternate path, however, focusing on those epistemic acts whereby the heretic gets its [End Page 2] right, so to speak, by correctly assenting to some of the articles of faith. Aquinas maintains that the heretic does not possess the infused virtue of faith yet still assents to all the articles of faith except for the one or more articles that he denies. Bereft of faith, the heretic “holds those things that are of faith by another mode than through faith.”6 This seemingly anomalous epistemic condition deserves consideration.7I. Intellects without FaithThe heretic appears to be cognitively privileged, since without faith he assents to the things that are of faith, seemingly overcoming without divine assistance the aforementioned disproportion between the limited range of reason and the articles of faith. Aquinas is aware of the apparent difficulty; in the Summa theologiae he defuses the rather unusual objection that heretics appear to have greater cognitive capacities than the faithful, since heretics routinely and unassistedly assent to those higher truths without possessing the virtue of faith.8 Aquinas concludes that the heretic holds the articles of faith by opinion (opinio), not faith.What makes one a heretic? Frequently Aquinas identifies obstinacy (pertinacia, instantia) as a necessary condition for heresy.9 The cause of heresy is at times identified with pride [End Page 3] (superbia).10 On Aquinas’s account, heresy is a species of unbelief (infidelitas) and every heretic is a schismatic.11 But the heretic does get many things right. If one were to deny all of the articles of faith, one would not qualify as a heretic, but would simply be a nonbeliever or an apostate. So, apart from the denial of an article (or a few articles) that specifies heretics as the distinct kind of heretic they happen to be, heretics for the most part succeed in assenting to most—but not all—of the articles of faith.Although the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 331 The Great Dissent: John Henry Newman and the Liberal Heresy. By ROBERT PATTISON. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. Pp. xiii +231. $29.95. This extremely provocative and elegantly written study of John Henry Newman's struggle with "liberalism" argues that Newman was a genuine rebel whose solitary voice needs to be heard, as much today as then, but whose project was, in the end, eminently unsuccessful. The (...) preface announces that the purpose of the book is to " establish Newman 's impeccable credentials as a failure," and the suggestion that " the totality of his failure is the measure of his grandeur as a critic of our culture" leads to the appraisal that Newman's true "intellectual counterparts " were Marx and Nietzsche and Lenin, rather than Arnold or Carlyle (vi-viii, 53). As "the single unwavering but articulate voice raised against liberalism in all its incarnations," Newman indirectly offers an " invaluable " description of the thought against which he battled, but his importance, the author suggests, lies in his utter failure to make a dent in the century of thought following him: " the victory of everything Newman despised makes his defeated and unfashionable view of Western civilization interesting not merely as a consistent critique of what has come to pass, hut as one of the few intelligible alternatives to the ideological monopoly of liberalism " (53). That alternative, a " consistent view of the world opposed to liberalism root and branch, sharing none of its premises and despising all of its works is an inestimable benefit, for no one more than the liberal himself," for without an "honest and unforgiving voice" like Newman's, the liberal " would smugly assume that the paradoxical tenets of his creed are... self-evident truths" (215). On the one hand, Newman's value lies in challenging liberalism's complacency, and treating "the ugliest manifestations of liberalism with the contempt they deserve but rarely provoke" (215). Moreover, Pattison allows that Newman offers an " acute refutation of its [liberalism's] major premises " (53) (if " refutation " is the ' achievement ' word I think it is, this seems inconsistent on Pattison's part). On the other hand, Newman's value lies precisely in failing to undermine liberalism-while he reminds liberalism that it is a heresy, thus provoking its vitality, it is only insofar as liberalism remains vital that " the possibilities of relative decency and tolerant forbearance remain alive" (216). The author argues, in other words, that Newman's attack on liberalism hits the mark with respect to liberalism's "ugliest manifestations," hut it is, unfortunately, tied to a theory of belief which entails an intolerant dogmatism. Newman is, in the end, a peculiar figure, described as 332 BOOK REVIEWS important and valuable (and even possibly correct-189), yet, none· theless, insignificant, "trivial" (8), and even "absurd" (143); like the Oxford Movement with which he is associated, he said to have made an "impression" without making an "impact" (25), and that, according to Pattison, is a blessing for those care about the liberal cause oftoleration (65, 178). Pattison begins in earnest his exploration of Newman's response to his age by examining his particular response to one critical, yet typical, opponent: "The combat with Renn Dickson Hampden epitomizes the process by which Newman determined the narrow compass of truth and formed his reply to the heresies of liberalism " (60). The " almost pathological detestation " of Hampden which the author attributes to Newman (77, n.40) is the response to principles put forth by Hampden which Newman saw as "the social expression of Socinianism," which was itself only a reincarnation of the Ari.an heresy (76). Hampden's heresy, on this view, grew out of Arianism-to understand that "is to see how Newman formed the standards of truth by which he condemned the modern world" (76). For Newman, "the modern world is a realization of Socinian beliefs," " the complex of contemporary civilization originated in the distorted beliefs of Arius" (198-99), and Arianism (Hampden's heresy, liberalism) raised the pressing question "what kind of truth could words express" (107). Pattison presents Newman's understanding of liberalism from two somewhat different perspectives-HberaHsm is not only anti-dogmatic, it also claims that one... (shrink)

On Indian saints, Indic philosophy, yoga, and the Indian way of life.

Philosophy of science is the organized expression of a growing intent among philosophers and scientists to clarify, perhaps unify, the programs, methods and results of the disciplines of philosophy and of science. The examination of fundamental concepts and presuppositions in the light of the positive results of science, systematic doubt of the positive results, and a thorough-going analysis and critique of logic and of language, are typical projects for this joint effort. It is not necessary to be committed to a (...) belief that science and philosophy are or should be one, or else that “never the twain shall meet.” If anything, there is to be expected a wholesome regard for the value of established science in furnishing a foil for philosophy and a check on its old extravagances. This does not mean that even the best-established science may not be subject to most devastating criticism by analysis of its foundations. In fact, despairing of the philosophy of the schools, science has done it largely for itself. The theories of gravitation, atomicity, electro-magnetism, evolution, relativity and quanta have all arisen through drastic revisions of complacent fundamental “truths.”. (shrink)

This study adopts the Cross-Cultural Speech Act Realization Patterns (CCSARP) framework to investigate the apology strategies used by L1 speakers of Tashelhit, a variety of Amazigh spoken in central Morocco. To this end, 82 university students either filled an assessment questionnaire or participated in an oral closed role-play. The findings indicated that L1 speakers of Tashelhit employed seven strategies to apologize, namely taking on responsibility, Illocutionary Force Indicating Devices (IFIDs), explanation or account, offer of repair, promise of forbearance, determinism, and (...) self-criticism. While taking on responsibility, IFIDs, and explanation or account were used most frequently in all the role-play situations to realize apologies, the other apology strategies appeared to be situation-dependent. There was also a tendency for L1 speakers of Tashelhit to use certain religious expressions to modify their apologies. These findings yielded a number of recommendations for further research and suggestions for improving the teaching of apologies in Tashelhit. (shrink)

The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) holds that, for everything that exists or occurs or holds true, there is a reason why that is the case. I consider three possible ways of relating physics to the PSR: past states as reasons for present states, reasons why the laws of physics take the form that they do, and reasons why there is anything at all. In each case I suggest that the PSR is not the best way of thinking about how (...) and why physics works. -/- Invited reflection for The Principle of Sufficient Reason (Oxford Philosophical Concepts), Eds. F. Amijee and M. Della Rocca (forthcoming 2024). (shrink)

Each of the following papers gives an account of a different UK clinical ethics committee. The committees vary in the length of time they have been established, and also in the main focus of their work. The accounts discuss the development of the committees and some of the ethical problems that have been brought to them. The issues raised will be relevant for other National Health Service (NHS) trusts in the UK that wish to set up such a committee.

Krause, C. F. Concepto subjetivo-objetivo de lo bello.--Krause, K. C. F. [y] Sanz del Río, J. El arte y la poesía.--Fernández y González, F. Lo bello y la naturaleza.--Paula Canalejas, F. de. Del carácter de las pasiones en la tragedia y en el drama.--Giner de los Ríos, F. El arte y las artes.--Giner de los Ríos, F. Consideraciones sobre el desarrollo de la literatura moderna.--Revilla, M. de la. El naturalismo en el arte.--Revilla, M. de la. La tendencia docente en la (...) literatura contemporánea.--González Serrano, U. Consideraciones sobre el arte y la poesía.--Alas, L. Benito Pérez Galdós. (shrink)

Juan B. Justo en la historia y el pensamiento argentinos, por A. Solari.--Teoría y práctica de la historia, por M. H. Alberti.--La base biológica de la historia, por F. Escardó.--La técnica, por A. Justo.--La economía, por R. Bogliolo.--La guerra, por A. G. Rodríguez.--La política, por A. Ghioldi.--La lucha de ciases, por R. Mondolfo.--El salariado, por M. Palacín.--Las formas típicas del privilegio, por J. L. Pena.--El gremialismo proletario, por E. Frugoni.--La cooperación libre, por N. Repetto.--La democracia obrera, por L. Pan.--La religión, (...) la cilencia, el arte, por R. Rivière. (shrink)

First published in 1995. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.